Experimental Evidence Of Incentive Effects Video
Thomas Dee on Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT Experimental Evidence Of Incentive Effects.This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance P4P. At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract.
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Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.
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Experimental evidence from rwandan primary schools
About this item: View Share Cite. Summary This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance P4P. Disclosure Status.
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